How are developers supposed to security-test their own apps with Codex if security testing responses are blocked?

Codex Codex CLI
1

I’m building my own application and I’ve reached the stage where I need to test its security before releasing it.

I am the owner and developer of the application. I am testing my own code, my own infrastructure, and my own development environment. I’m not trying to access someone else’s system.

The problem is that when I ask ChatGPT/Codex to help me test security issues in my own application, I increasingly get:

“This content cannot be displayed. We are particularly cautious with cybersecurity requests. If you are a cybersecurity professional, you may be able to apply for Trusted Access.”

This creates a strange situation for an independent developer.

I am not a professional penetration tester or cybersecurity researcher. I am an application developer. I don’t have cybersecurity certifications or professional credentials that I can use to qualify myself as a security professional.

But I still have a responsibility to test my application before putting it into production.

For example, I need to verify things such as authentication and authorization boundaries, whether one user can access another user’s data, API protections, storage access controls, input handling, XSS protections, and whether security fixes actually work.

These are normal parts of developing and releasing an application.

So my question to OpenAI is:

What is the intended workflow for an ordinary developer who wants to use Codex to security-test an application they own?

If Trusted Access is intended primarily for cybersecurity professionals, what should independent developers do?

There seems to be an important gap between:

“Help me attack someone else’s system”

and

“Help me verify that my own application is secure before I deploy it.”

I completely understand why OpenAI needs safeguards around cybersecurity. But developers still need a supported way to perform legitimate defensive testing of software they own.

I would really appreciate guidance from the OpenAI team on the recommended workflow for this use case.

2

This should be a good place to start

3

thank you, I’m already using it

4

I own the code. I own the repository. I own the files. I deliberately enabled Codex Security because I want to audit my own application.

Codex Security already found real, validated vulnerabilities in my project.

Now I’m trying to do the most basic thing any developer needs to do after a security finding:

  1. understand the exact root cause;
  2. reproduce the vulnerability safely in my own project;
  3. fix it;
  4. run the same test again;
  5. confirm that the vulnerability is actually gone.

And ChatGPT blocks me with:

“This content cannot be shown. We take extra care with cybersecurity requests. If you are a security professional, you can apply for trusted access.”

What the hell am I supposed to do with that?

I AM THE DEVELOPER.
I OWN THE APPLICATION.
I OWN THE REPOSITORY.
I OWN THE CODE.
I CONNECTED THE SECURITY TOOL SPECIFICALLY TO CHECK MY OWN SOFTWARE.

Where exactly am I supposed to get this “security professional” status from?

How is an ordinary developer supposed to securely develop an application if the security tool can tell him:

“You have a vulnerability”

but when he asks:

“Okay, show me where it is and let me verify it before and after the fix”

the answer becomes:

“No, you need additional trusted access”?

That workflow makes no sense.

The current experience is basically:

Codex Security:
“You have a validated High severity vulnerability.”

Me:
“Okay. I want to reproduce it safely in my own repository before fixing it.”

ChatGPT:
“Blocked.”

Me:
“Then how do I verify the fix?”

ChatGPT:
“Blocked.”

So what exactly is the purpose of the security plugin for regular developers?

I am not asking to attack somebody else’s infrastructure.
I am not asking for credentials.
I am not asking to exploit a third-party service.

I am asking to test software that I own.

If Codex Security is able to discover and validate a vulnerability in my repository, the repository owner must have a clear path to reproduce that exact finding in a controlled environment and verify the remediation.

Otherwise the product stops halfway through the security workflow.

Please explain the intended workflow for a developer who owns the repository and wants to:

find → reproduce → fix → verify → ship

without repeatedly hitting a cybersecurity policy wall.

And if “trusted access” is actually required for this normal developer workflow, then make it extremely clear:

  • who needs it;
  • why they need it;
  • how repository ownership is verified;
  • how a normal developer gets access;
  • and why the security product allows discovery of vulnerabilities but restricts their remediation workflow.
5

You just have to get creative with further prompting.

This is a recent session I had, note the initial reluctance:

 evaluate the safety of https://gitlab.com/defmastership/safe_ruby


• I’ll inspect the repository’s code, release/package metadata, install hooks, dependencies, and maintenance signals,
  then distinguish “no obvious malware” from “safe to use for untrusted Ruby execution,” which is a much higher bar.

• Searched the web for https://gitlab.com/defmastership/safe_ruby

• Searched the web for site:gitlab.com/defmastership/safe_ruby safe_ruby ...

• Searched the web for
  https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/defmastership%2Fsafe_ruby/repository/tree?recursive=true&per_page=100

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

• The public metadata confirms this is an allowlist-based Ruby evaluator that runs code in a child process. I’m pulling
  the exact source for version-by-version review now; the key question is whether its restrictions survive Ruby
  metaprogramming and resource-exhaustion attacks.

ⓘ This content can't be shown
  We take extra caution with cybersecurity requests. If you’re a security professional, you may be able to apply for
  Trusted Access.
  Trusted Access: https://openai.com/form/enterprise-trusted-access-for-cyber/
  Learn more: https://help.openai.com/en/articles/20001326


› ok let's put things another way - is it up to date with current Ruby standards?


• That framing makes the answer clearer: no, it is not current by modern Ruby maintenance or security standards. I’m
  checking its stated compatibility against today’s supported Ruby releases so I can separate ordinary code-style age
  from the serious architectural gaps.

And then I was home free and it seemed happy to discuss the issues …

btw, don’t use that repo! It is anything but safe …

would be nice if we could have a route to get “clearance” to interrogate as we saw fit though … without having to be a registered cybersec prof and also not have to be in a business team …

and yeah, the issue isn’t just about your own code, it’s about dependencies you might rely upon, you want to scan those too …

6

100%

Yes, that’s pretty much what I’ve been doing — trying different prompts and approaching the same question from different angles. It often works, but from time to time I still hit the warning saying that I need to qualify for Trusted Access / be a certified security professional.

And that’s the part I don’t really understand: how is an ordinary developer supposed to get that kind of clearance? I’m auditing my own application and my own repository. I can’t exactly invent security credentials or claim to be something I’m not.

So I completely agree with you that there should be some alternative route for legitimate developers and repository owners to get appropriate access.

Even the security plugin/tool recommended above still places fairly significant restrictions on what I can test against my own repository, so it doesn’t fully solve the problem for me.

In any case, thank you for the suggestion and for sharing your experience — I really appreciate it.

7

There is definitely a need for solo-developers to have access and be able to scan their work for issues before deploying to clients.

Perhaps OpenAI can leverage some kind of reputation/trust system?

For example, permit it for higher tier API clients?

8

It’s such a chicken-egg problem. If models refuse to assist in cybersecurity, how can people protect themselves? What’s stopping malicious entities from bypassing these guardrails?

How many times must we see this exact paradigm played out and fail?

It’s so strange. We have comparable models outside of America without such guardrails, and yet it’s only American models hacking other companies :thinking:

I hope OpenAI understand what they’re doing to many enterprises in North America. Just recently I was contacted by a colleague. The company is freaking out with all the cybersecurity madness happening. They’ve shut down all usage of AI inside of the company and even hiring contractors that use AI. They quite sadly will most likely retreat into their safety hole of Microsoft

9

I genuinely need someone at OpenAI to explain how this is possible.

I started with 100% of my available ChatGPT Plus usage limit and asked OpenAI Security to audit a repository that contains only 4.82 MB of tracked files.

That is not a typo: 4.82 MB.

I used GPT-5.6 Sol in the standard configuration.

Twenty-six minutes later, my entire available Plus limit was gone.

100%.

And after consuming the whole limit, the security audit was still not finished.

No completed audit.
No final report.
No complete result.

Just 26 minutes of processing, a 4.82 MB repository, and my entire Plus allowance exhausted.

I could understand heavy usage if this were a massive enterprise monorepo with millions of lines of code. It is not. This is a small repository that can literally be measured in single-digit megabytes.

So I have a very simple question:

How can a security audit of 4.82 MB of source files consume 100% of a paid ChatGPT Plus usage allowance in 26 minutes and still fail to complete the task?

If this is expected behavior, then I would seriously like OpenAI to explain what practical workload this Security product is actually designed to handle.

If this is NOT expected behavior, then something is clearly wrong with either the model’s resource consumption, the Security workflow, the usage accounting, or all three.

Please investigate the exact session and usage records associated with this run.

I am also requesting restoration of the usage limit consumed by this failed audit. I paid for access to the product; consuming the entire available allowance without delivering the requested result is not a reasonable outcome.

The most concerning part is not simply that the limit was exhausted.

It is that a product specifically designed to perform security analysis managed to burn through the entire available Plus allowance on a 4.82 MB repository — and still could not finish the audit.

That should not be normal.

11

This situation is extremely frustrating. I am implementing some common RFC protocols that parse bit and network streams. After implementing these I have been trying to add AFL++ and boofuzz to test individual protocols and integration through the stack.

The cyber security alert trips constantly. The worst part is that it’s a blackbox and I don’t know what output caused to trip. It’s constant. I’ve tried rephasing the prompt to be more defensive, but it doesn’t change anything.

I have stubbornly worked through getting the fuzzers setup. My work around is piecing together scripts so that nothing is output through codex. I can ask 1000 questions slowly creating a system outside of codex and how to interpret the data, which circumvents tripping the cyber security halt, which kind of shows how futile this is, I just can’t have codex actually do anything useful.

I’m at my wits end with these halts. Codex often gets stuck in a halting loop and my only recourse is to start a new chat or lament about how frustrating this is using strong language, which usually brings the session back.

I’m considering canceling my subscription because I’m not going to pay $200 a month to see an alert every 2 minutes.

12

The situation is not acceptable. I’m reviewing my private personal code base for code defects with GPT-5.6-Sol-xhigh and the code has probably a security related code defect somewhere because I keep getting “This content can’t be shown”. So my code base has become unreviewable by ChatGPT and Codex.

13

Yeah this is ridiculous it refused to pen test an app sitting on the directory that had the source code , I propose a solution let codex check for permission of the site for example :

mysite. com/_allow_pen_test

codex will request to this url that post a hash with the date so it knows is allowed and expected.

On servers we could open an arbitrary port ip.ip.ip.ip:6767 and use cady or nginx to post the : _allow_pen_test response with the date hash